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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/03/2011

Accident number: 665
Accident Date: 17th August 2008

Accident time: 08:54
Where it occurred: MF 081, Dragi village,
Tani district, Khost
Province
Primary cause: Field Control
Inadequacy

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Management Control
Inadequacy
th
Date of main report: 17 October 2010

Class: Excavation Accident

Name of source: UNMACCA

ID original source: Ref # 214
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast

Ground condition: mountainous
Date last modified: 06/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
Inadequate investigation (?)
Squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
Visor not worn or worn raised (?)
Inadequate equipment (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing (?)
Inadequate training (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some

1

formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as
more information becomes available.
The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (UNMACCA)
Ref # 214: File: OPS/14/17 /October /2010
Subject: Investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group] CBDT-23 Demining
Accident.
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of demining accident
happened on 17 August 2010 at 08:54 hrs, in Dragi village Tani district of Khost province.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-23 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
Demining investigation teams were convened by AMAC Gardez and [Demining group] to
investigate and find out the cause of the demining accident involving [TheVictim] the deminer
of [Demining group] CBDT-23. The accident occurred at 8:54 hours, on 17 August 2010 in
Task # AF/3203/00398/MF 081 located in Dragi village, Tani district of Khost province.
SUMMARY:
Task # AF/3203/00398/MF 081 is located in a mountainous area contaminated with antipersonnel mines, in Dec 2009 the area polygon surveyed by [Demining group] LIAT–1 1.
Mines planted by Russian forces during the year 1984 to protect their position from the
possible attacks of Mujahiddin.
Mine clearance operations in Tani district started by [Demining group] as community based
demining approach and deminers from the community are engaged in this operation. On 8th
July 2010, CBDT-23 started demining operations in mentioned minefield, the progress was
around 20% till the demining accident happened. The team found/destroyed 4 anti-personal
mines up to the accident time.
On 17 August 2010 [the Victim] the deminer was working in his clearance lane excavating a
detected signal, his excavation tool touched a mine and caused it to explode. According to the
investigation report the signal was not pinpointed correctly and the deminer has used his
bayonet directly on the top of anti-personnel mine, so the accident happened. Unfortunately
the victim deminer was not fully dressed with PPE, so he got severe injuries on his eyes,
whole face and finger of his left hand.
As the majority of minefields in Tani district are located on the hillsides, and the likelihood of
mines with changed position due to seasonal flood is high. Therefore, a comprehensive site
operations plan was required covering all the predictable scenarios during the clearance
operations e.g. changes in direction of mines, mine displacement etc. But this point was
missed in the site operations plan.
CONCLUSIONS:
The main contributing factor to this accident was the carelessness of deminer himself. In
addition, as the deminer was working without having worn his PPE appropriately and had not
been controlled by the command group, therefore, the weakness of command and control is
also noticeable.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
A. [Demining group] operation department is recommended to take necessary action in terms
of strengthening command and control element in their teams especially in community based
projects.
B. A strong discipline should be emplaced in all community based projects as this is the third
accident within Tani CBD project of the same scenario.
C. As Tani is a tribal area and all the people are strongly following their elders, therefore, the
issue of carelessness of deminers should be discussed with elders and the possible
consequences of the situation should be detailed to them.
D. [Demining group] operations department is recommended to develop a plan for the
improvement of supervision, command and control in their teams.
E. Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required
to be submitted to the MACCA office by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue date of this
letter

Victim Report
Name: [Name removed]

Victim number:

Gender: Male

Age:
Status: Deminer

Fit for work: Not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron, Visor

Protection used: Frontal apron

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: Severe eyes, Severe face, Severe hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the Victim was working without pin-pointing his metal-detector reading
and without wearing his visor but his errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed
as a Management Control Inadequacy because the “community” deminer appears to have
been inadequately prepared for his role and not overseen by suitably competent field
supervisors.
The Inadequate training under Notes refers to the Victim’s inability to use his detector
appropriately, dangerous excavation technique and failure to wear PPE correctly. The
Inadequate equipment under Notes refers to the issue of a short handtool that does not meet
the IMAS recommendation for blast-resistant tools.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years
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in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary
implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the
UN to share it with others is regrettable.

4

